Deputy appointment is surrounded by numerous statutory safeguards (e.g. appointment must be in the best interest of the person, supervision by the Public Guardian, annual report, Court of Protection visitors, etc.). Additionally, any Deputyship order the Court makes, will set out the Deputy's specific powers in relation to the protected person. Powers can relate to property and affairs only, health and welfare, or both areas.
The Court, to date, has been reluctant to appoint deputies (especially health and welfare deputies). This can be explained with the new approach of the law. One of the key principles of the MCA is that every person is assumed to have capacity unless it is proved otherwise. In practice, this means that even when a Deputy has been appointed, there is an ongoing duty to assess whether the person has capacity to make each separate decision as it arises.
(4) Enduring Power/Lasting Power of Attorney (ss 22-23 MCA)
The Court of Protection has the power to hear cases concerning objections to register an LPA or EPA and make decisions about whether or not an LPA or EPA is valid.
Structure and Composition of the Court
The jurisdiction of the CoP is exercised by various levels of judges. Under the old law, the Court of Protection had the power to appoint a Receiver to deal with the property and affairs of someone who lacked capacity. The Receiver's role was purely financial. The donor appointed two attorneys to act jointly and severally. 14 She then imposed the following restriction: 'neither of my attorneys will act without the approval of the other'. The restriction was found invalid because it is inconsistent with joint and several appointments. This condition would have been valid if the attorneys had been jointly appointed.
b. Orders made by the Court on LPAs Re Azancot (order of Senior Judge Lush made on 27 May 2009)
A personal welfare LPA contained a restriction which required that the attorney 'may only act under this power in the event that the donor is physically or mentally incapacitated'. The words 'physically or' were severed from the LPA, as the MCA prescribes that a personal welfare attorney may only make a decision if the donor lacks mental capacity to make it.
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Re P (order of Senior Judge Lush made on 9 June 2009)
The following restriction was found to be contrary to the joint and several appointments of three attorneys: 'I require that two attorneys must act at any one time so that no attorney may act alone.'
Re Collis (judgment of Senior Judge Lush made on 27 October 2010)
An application was made to the Court to cancel the registration of an LPA on the grounds that the donor lacked mental capacity to create an LPA at the date of execution. In his judgment, Senior
Judge Lush set out the law relating to capacity to create an LPA. There seems to be a discrepancy between this decision and the next two cases which follow the instructions of the MCA more closely.
circumstances, for example in cases where the protected person is at risk of harm from family members or there is a long history of disputes between the carers).
G v E [2010] EWHC 2512 (COP) (Fam)
This case reaffirms the opinion articulated in the previous case. Baker J refused to appoint E's carers as either welfare or financial affairs deputies. He ruled that routine decisions concerning E's day-today care (like holiday or respite care) can be taken by the carers without being appointed as deputies and if disagreement arises between the carers and/or other professionals, an application should be made to the Court of Protection to settle the dispute.
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Baker v H & another [2009] WTLR 1719 (COP)
The applicant, Mr Baker is the professional property and affairs deputy of H, an 8 year old child who suffered serious brain injury as a result of mismanagement of his birth. There was a settlement with the hospital under which H received a lump sum of £1,211,714 and annual periodical payments (commencing at £25,000, rising to £32,000 at age 11 and £85,000 at age 18). 20 A house was purchased for H, leaving around £445,000 of capital and £25,000 yearly income under the control of Mr Baker. The first instance Court required that Mr Baker gives a security of £750.000 which he claimed to be disproportionate. Judge Hazel Marshall reduced the amount of security to £175,000
and elaborated on a list of factors that the Court of Protection shall take into account when setting securities for deputies. 21 These factors are:
The value and vulnerability of the assets which are under the control of the deputy.
How long it might be before a default or loss is discovered. The judgment of Judge Horowitz was affirmed by HHJ Turner QC on appeal. In paragraph 42, he held that 'specific decisions of the court are to be preferred to the ongoing appointment of a deputy and when a deputy must be appointed it is to be for the narrowest scope and the shortest time reasonably practicable in the circumstances'. He also ruled that 'mere convenience to a local authority to avoid having to come to court' was not relevant when it comes to the appointment of deputies (para. 43).
The availability and extent of any other remedy or resource available to P in the event of a default or loss.
P's immediate needs in the event of a default or loss.
The cost to P of ordering security, and the possibilities and cost of increasing his protection in any other way.
The gravity of the consequences of loss or default for P, in his circumstances.
The status, experience and record of the particular deputy. section 4 of the MCA) but they will not necessarily be the deciding factor.
Substituted decision making -capacity and best interests assessment
Re S and S (Protected Persons), C v V [2009] WTLR 315
This case stands in opposition to the previous one. Judge Marshall held that where the protected person does express a wish or a view, which is not irrational, impracticable and irresponsible, then it should carry great weight in assessing the best interests of P.
Mr and Mrs S (aged 83 and 81, respectively) executed an Enduring Power of Attorney appointing their daughters (C and V), jointly, to be their attorneys. C refused to register the EPA, since she was not convinced about her parents' incapacity. V applied to the Court of Protection to be appointed as receiver (deputy) for her parents. The district judge established the incapacity of Mr and Mrs S and appointed V as their deputy. Judge Marshall overruled this order. She argued that the wishes of Mr and Mrs S, namely that 'if both daughters were unable to act jointly, neither of them should act singly' had not been taken into account. This is neither an irrational nor irresponsible requirement.
Thus, she appointed an independent deputy in place of V.
An NHS Foundation Trust v D [2010] EWHC 2535 (COP)
This case concerned the medical best interests of D, a woman with schizophrenia, who was suffering from a prolapsed uterus, but believed 'that there is a conspiracy on the part of medical personnel to subjugate and experiment upon her, if not kill her'. The court was told that if she is left untreated, her condition could prove fatal. Macur J concluded that it was in D's best interests to retain her in hospital, to conduct the necessary examinations and thereafter operate her using all such restraint (physical or chemical) as necessary.
DH NHS Foundation Trust v PS [2010] EWHC 1217 (COP)
This case concerned a 55 year old woman with learning disabilities who refused to undergo surgery aimed at removing the cancer from her uterus. The judge ruled that it was in the patient's best interests to undergo operation and authorised the necessary use of force to sedate her and convey her to hospital.
b. Capacity assessment A Primary Care Trust v P and AH (2009) EW Misc 10 (EWCOP)
P, aged 24, suffers from mild learning disability and a severe form of uncontrolled epilepsy. P lived for the majority of his life with AH who adopted him in 1993. There had been lengthy disputes over the treatment of P's epilepsy between AH and the medical authorities. At a certain point AH decided to withdraw all of P's anti-epileptic medication which caused life-threatening and prolonged seizures and resulted in P's hospitalization. The applicant (the Primary Care Trust) wanted to provide P with independent living accommodation with limited contact with his mother. AH sought to resume the care of P on a full time basis.
Hedley J stated that cases where a) a person is unable to understand the information relevant to the decision, b) is unable to retain that information or d) is unable to communicate his decision are relatively easy cases for capacity assessment. Difficult cases, such as this one, are related to section 3
(1) (c) MCA [the capacity actually to engage in the decision-making process].
The judge ruled that P lacked capacity. He took the following factors into consideration: (1) P's epilepsy, (2) P's learning disability, (3) P's enmeshed relationship with his mother, (4) P's inability to visualise any prospect of having a different view to his mother. The judge ruled that it was P's best interest to be removed from his mother and placed to a different environment.
It was one of the first CoP cases that were open to the public. The media was allowed to attend the hearing under the condition that the parties would not be named.
An independent living environment does not usually entail deprivation of liberty. However, the Court ruled that in this case it did so, because it severely limited the contact between P and his mother. Thus, the Court 'obliged' P to become independent from his mother. 
D v R (Deputy of S) and S [2010] EWHC 2405 (COP)
Mr S, a 77 year old man, after suffering a stroke requested help at home with various chores. He befriended Mrs D, who became his primary carer. S gave gifts worth over £500,000 to Mrs D. S's financial deputy (his daughter) questioned the validity of these donations on the basis of incapacity.
Mrs D sought a declaration from the Court that S possessed mental capacity when giving the mentioned gifts.
Justice Henderson stated that 'the fact that the decision is an unwise one does not, of itself, justify a conclusion of lack of capacity' and that 'a person in his lifetime has the freedom to act in a manner which is (for example) unwise, capricious, or designed to spite his relations'.
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However, after having conducted his analysis, he came to the clear conclusion that S lacked capacity because he was unable to understand the information relevant to the decision, unable to retain it, and unable to use or weigh it as part of the decision making process.
D Borough Council v AB (Rev 1) [2011] EWHC 101 (COP)
Alan has moderate learning disability. He had been living with a man called Kieron with whom he entered into homosexual relationship. Alan was also reported to 'harass' underage students in public. The local authorities sought an order authorising a restriction of contact between Alan and Kieron (and between Alan and another person) so as to prevent further sexual relations taking place.
The order was granted by the District Judge. Since then Alan has been subjected to close supervision to prevent any further sexual activity on his part, other than private masturbation. 
D County Council v LS (2010) EWHC 1544 (Fam) (COP)
This case examined the implications of R v C to a previous CoP decision. Although the original decision was not altered, Wood J stated that capacity requires not only an understanding of the relevant information but also the ability to retain and weigh it in the balance. Capacity to consent to sexual relations (and capacity to consent to marriage) is person and situation specific.
The Jurisdiction of the Court
Re F [2009] EWHC B30 (Fam)
The case deals with the test which has to be satisfied with regard to a person's capacity in order to found the jurisdiction of the Court of Protection under section 48 of the MCA (i.e. to make interim orders). The District Judge refused to make an interim order in the case of Mrs F because there was no conclusive evidence that she lacked mental capacity (the assessors had different and rather inconclusive opinions). The High Court stated that it is sufficient that the individual may lack capacity to establish the Court's jurisdiction under section 48 (i.e. there is 'good reason to believe' or there is 'a real possibility').
Re P and OM (unreported, 26 November 2008)
The High Court confirmed that the Court of Protection had jurisdiction in health and welfare matters over P, an incapacitated British citizen residing abroad. The Court ordered P's son to return his mother from Guyana to England in order to make decisions concerning her health and welfare. The
Court's jurisdiction was founded upon the fact that paragraph 7 of Schedule 3 to the MCA gives jurisdiction over an adult habitually resident in England and Wales, and the Court accepted that a person cannot change their habitual residence once they lose their capacity (P was habitually resident in England and she was moved to Guyana after becoming incapacitated). 
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